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Abstract – Energy has become one of the most important fields of international policy since many countries are now aware that 
traditional (fossil) energy sources are finite. The European Union and China among the others try to ensure their sustainable 
energy supply and energy security. Both of them are net importers, their growing economy based on external energy sources. 
The Middle – East Africa and Eurasia have been the energy supplier regions in the world, but today the taut situation in those 
regions and the fierce competition between the EU and China force them to find new energy fields. The Arctic region is rich in 
hydrocarbon and other energy sources that have not been exploited yet. That is why the EU and China pay more attention to this 
region. This article attempts to reveal the different energy policies of the EU and China towards the substantial fossil energy 
resources of the Arctic taking into consideration the increasing need for renewable energy sources and the growing demand to 
phase out fossil fuels, particularly coal. First, a brief overview of the energy sources and institutions of the Arctic region 
illuminates the major role of the Arctic Council, then the European Union’s and China’s energy policy and their current energy 
situation are analyzed. The next paragraphs reveal the recent steps, future targets, and achievements of the European and Chinese 
energy policy towards the Arctic. These paragraphs describe the Neo-Liberal energy policy of the European Community and the 
Realist or Neo-Liberal ways of Chinese energy strategy, unfortunately, based mainly on fossil fuels. However, due to increasing 
political pressure because of climate change and environmental pollution, the development of renewable energy sources is 
imperative, often integrated into one “more sustainable” system with the traditional fossil energy sources. The central question 
is: Whose policy will win the battle for the Arctic region’s energy sources? It means whose policy will be more effective to 
obtain energy sources, both fossil and renewable ones. Finally, it sums up and compares the differences between the two 
international actors’ energy policy regarding their strategies for explorations of fossil fuels and renewables and highlights the 
different ways and tools of their energy diplomacy.               
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Energy has become one of the most important fields of 
international policy since many countries have become aware 
that energy sources are limited. We can classify the 
international actors into different groups by their energy 
reserves. The actor which has relevant energy sources can be 
called the “supplier” and the actor without any or not enough 
energy reserves can be called a “buyer.” “Suppliers” realized 
their energy advantages and started using them as the new 
tools of international policy. They know that all countries 
need energy but only a few have it, so exporting countries 
have economic leverage according to their resources.  
“Buyers” are more and more dependent on “suppliers,” as the 
value of energy on the international market increases. 
Considering the aforementioned principle, for this study the 
European Union and China have been selected as two main 
actors, still competing for the energy sources of the Arctic 
region, even if phasing out fossil energy sources has become 
an increasingly important strategic goal for many nations due 
to the realization of the adverse effects of climate change and 
the need to mitigate its consequences. The exploration of the 
natural resources of the Arctic has been going on since the 
beginning of the 20th century. Coal mining started in 1906 in 
Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Norway (Norum, 2016). Extraction 
of rich mineral resources such as gold, nickel, diamonds, coal, 
oil, and gas has been developing in Russia (then the Soviet 
Union), Canada, Alaska, Scandinavia, and Greenland for 
decades. The Soviet Union pioneered the Arctic oil and gas 
exploration already in the 1930s. In the US, after success in 
Prudhoe Bay, the first offshore exploratory well was drilled 
in 1976. Exploration drilling off Alaska peaked in 1984 -
1985, but with the oil price crash and high operation costs, no 
substantial production followed.  
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According to the definition above, both the European Union  
and China are “buyers” (Giber, 2010). How do the above 
mentioned two “buyers” come to the Arctic region? The 
Arctic region has several mineral sources such as oil, natural 
gas, coal, gold, silver, diamond and many other mineral 
deposits (Xin & Andrews-Speed, 2006). These sources have 
not been exploited yet. However, the Arctic region seems to 
be the next energy supplier region in the world. The present 
energy provider regions are the Middle- East, Africa and 
Eurasia. The European Union and China import energy 
sources from all the three regions. According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, the Arctic region holds 
22 percent of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil and 
natural gas resources. This information can be attractive for 
both the European Union and China.  
 
1.The Arctic Region   
The territory of the Arctic can be divided into three areas. 
About one-third of the Arctic is occupied by land and the 
other one-third of the Arctic consists of offshore continental 
shelves located in less than 500 meters in the Arctic Ocean. 
The remaining one-third of the Arctic is in deeper than 500 
meters in the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 1). The Arctic Ocean is the 
smallest of Earth’s five oceans with a surface of 14.056 
million km2 including a deep-sea around the North Pole and 
the Baffin Bay, Barents Sea, Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, East 
Siberian Sea, Greenland Sea, Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait, 
Kara Sea and Laptev Sea (Fig. 2).  
It is connected to the Pacific Ocean through the Bering Strait 
and to the Atlantic Ocean through the Labrador Sea and the 
Greenland Sea (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 1. Arctic Ocean Seafloor Features Map. Major Basins, Ridges, Shelves and Bathymetry. Source: 
https://geology.com/Arcticles/arctic-ocean-features/  
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Figure 2. The peripherical parts (shelf-seas) and connections 
to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans of the Arctic Ocean. Source: 
https://www.geoexpro.com/Arcticles/2012/01/how-can-we-
explore-the-russian-arctic-shelf  
 
The quite poorly explored area of sedimentary basins and 
continental shelves above the Arctic Circle hold enormous oil 
and natural gas reserves, which are estimated to contain about 
13 percent of the world's undiscovered conventional oil 
resources and about 30 percent of its undiscovered 
conventional natural gas resources. About 1/3 of the Arctic’s 
area is land, which probably contains approximately 16% of 
the Arctic's remaining undiscovered oil and gas resource. The 
Arctic continental shelves constitute the other 1/3 of the arctic 
area with vast resources, that remain virtually unexplored. 
The remaining 1/3 of the Arctic is covered by over 500 meters 
deep ocean, and this area is unexplored.  
 
The fossil energy sources of the Arctic region such as oil and 
natural gas are not equally shared among Eurasia and the 
North American continent. Eurasia holds about 63 percent of 
the total Arctic resources, while North America owns about 
36 percent. The Eurasian resources are predominantly natural 
gas and natural gas liquids (NGL), which account for about 
88 percent of the total Eurasian resource base. The North 
American side of the Arctic is more oil-prone, estimated to 
have about 65 percent of the undiscovered Arctic oil, but only 
26 percent of the undiscovered Arctic natural gas. The 
exploration of energy sources is much harder in the Arctic 
than in the other energy supplier regions in the world. The 
extreme weather conditions of the Arctic make drilling and 
exploration more expensive. Harsh winters require specially 
                                                             
1 Tromsø Declaration On the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial 
Meeting of The Arctic Council, Tromso, Norway 29. April, 2009 p.6. 
designed equipment; icepacks can harm offshore facilities, 
and make the shipments of people, materials, equipment or 
oil more difficult. In addition, limited transportation access 
and long supply lines increase transportation costs (Budzik, 
P. 2009). In spite of the heavy conditions, because of the 
increasing value of energy, the Arctic will be in the focus of 
the EU and China in the future as long as their energy hunger 
is growing. The competition between them in Africa, the taut 
situation in the Middle-East and Eurasia results in the 
increasing price of oil, natural gas and coal. The Arctic could 
be a new energy supplier of fossil fuels region without such a 
fierce competition. 
   
The difficulties of China and the European Union in gaining 
the Arctic energy sources come from their geographical 
location. The EU and China are not in the neighborhood of 
the Arctic Region, that is why they have no voice in the 
highest forum of the Arctic. The Arctic Council was 
established by the eight arctic countries with sovereignty over 
the territory of the Arctic. Namely, they are Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the 
United States (US Dept. of States, 2010). The establishing 
document of the Arctic Council, the Ottawa Declaration 
created for cooperation between the Arctic countries was 
signed in 1996. The above mentioned eight countries are the 
member states of the council. The Arctic Council is the only 
high-level intergovernmental forum that involves all the eight 
Arctic states. Besides the member states, the representatives 
of the Arctic indigenous people, communities and 
organizations gained Permanent Participant status also take 
part in all meetings and activities of the Arctic Council.  
 
The biennial Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting is the main 
event where the Council sets its agenda and at the end of the 
meeting pass the chairmanship of the council from one 
permanent member to the other one. The Sixth Ministerial 
Meeting of the Arctic Council was taken place in Tromsø, 
Norway in 2009. The member states emphasized the 
necessity of technology and regulations in order to reduce the 
impact of oil and gas activities. “They recognized that 
environmentally sound oil and gas activities may contribute 
to sustainable development of the Arctic region1”. Further-
more, they approved the findings and recommendations of the 
Assessment of Oil and Gas Activities in the Arctic: Effects 
and Potential Effects. The document was published under the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP).  
 
The Arctic Council’s decision about holding a meeting on the 
Deputy Minister level, with a representative of Permanent 
participants in order to discuss emerging issues between the 
Ministerial meetings shows their strengthening role. At the 
end of the meeting, Norway passed the chairmanship to 
Denmark (Tromsø Declaration, 2009). In addition to the 
member states and the permanent participants, there is a 
category of Permanent Observer which is open to Non-Arctic 
countries. The permanent observer states of the Arctic 
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Council are the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Spain (Figure 3.).   
 
The European Union, China, Italy, and South Korea had 
applied for the permanent observer position in the Arctic 
Council but were rejected. The reasons for it can be the 
conflict on seal hunting between some of the Arctic states and 
the EU, or the fear of the economically developed China 
(Phillips, 2010). The EU and China managed to obtain only 
the ad-hoc observer status along with Italy and South Korea 
in the Arctic Council. Thus, their attendance must be 
approved by member states at each meeting (Arctic Council, 
1998). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Arctic Council Map. Permanent members in dark 
blue; observers in light blue. Source: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arctic_Council_map.png  
 
The Arctic Council accepted the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines on 29 April 2009. “These Guidelines are intended 
to be used to the Arctic nations for offshore oil and gas 
activities during planning, exploration, development, 
production and decommissioning. The target group for the 
Guidelines is thus primarily the authorities, but the 
Guidelines may also be of help to the industry when planning 
for oil and gas activities and to the public in understanding 
environmental concerns and practices of Arctic offshore oil 
and gas activities.” (Arctic Council, 2009). This document 
provides a comprehensive regulatory framework including 
several approaches to Arctic offshore oil and gas activities. 
The Guidelines offer a detailed description of what to do in 
case of emergencies, safety, and environmental management, 
environmental monitoring and operating practices. The 
                                                             
2 GWP = Global Warming Potential -  is a measure of how much heat 
a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere up to a specific time 
horizon, relative to carbon dioxide. 
document advises using the best available and the safest 
technologies for offshore oil and gas activities in order to 
minimize their impacts on the environment.  Annex E 
provides an overview of offshore activities and potential 
environmental effects (Arctic Council, 2009). Therefore, the 
council clearly declared, that the International Maritime 
Organisation will have to develop new guidelines for ships 
operating in Arctic waters, as well as mandatory regulations 
on safety and environmental protection. Furthermore, 
guidelines on oil and gas exploration and a task force on how 
to reduce non-CO2 drivers of climate change such as methane 
which, due to its high GWP2, might play a key role in Arctic 
climate change, were also established. Generally, the 
Guidelines try to find the golden mean between the protection 
of the unique Arctic environment and the promotion of 
exploration of energy sources in the area. The elaboration of 
these Guidelines shows the growing attention of the Arctic 
nations to oil and gas activities. It seems to recognize that 
explorations can give economically sustainable development 
for the Arctic communities and indigenous people, but 
concerns were raised regarding the environmental risks of 
exploration and the long-term viability of fossil fuel 
production due to climate change. The most developed 
energy fields are situated in Russia because these fields were 
developed mostly under the Soviet command-and-control 
economy. Probably, they were not economically profitable at 
the time. The North American fields are less developed 
compared to Russia’s because the development was governed 
by market-based economics there (Budzik, 2009). 
 
Figure 4. shows how the oil and gas activities of the Arctic 
region have become more and more intensive from the pre-
1960’s until 2004. One of the main conditions which affect 
the production and activity in the Arctic is the infrastructure. 
The high costs of pipelines and transportation are tremendous 
for investors since lower energy prices cannot cover the 
expenses of drilling costs, infrastructures and transportation 
costs. The continuously rising prices of energy sources will 
make the explorations in the Arctic more intensive.  Even if 
the relevant expenditures, for example, Alaska is going to 
build a gas pipeline in the near future, Canada is planning to 
build a pipeline through the Mackenzie Delta and Russia has 
carried out the Shtokman natural gas project (Budzik, 2009). 
Furthermore, Russia has planned to deliver oil from Arctic 
Russia to Europe since the beginning of the 2000s. However, 
even if exploration, development of production, and transport 
facilities for oil, gas, and mineral resources is increasing 
throughout the circumpolar region, receding sea ice cover and 
permafrost thaw will influence accessibility to mineral and 
energy resources both on land and in the Continental Shelf in 
the future (Turunen, 2019). 
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The main regions in the Arctic with vast oil and natural gas 
exploitation are the Beaufort Sea (North Slope, Alaska and 
Mackenzie Delta, Canada), and the northwest part of the 
Russian Arctic (the Barents Sea and West-Siberia). Oil and 
gas are also found in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
(Nunavut). These three regions are also targeted for future 
exploitation. According to recent estimates from the US 
Geological Survey (Turunen, 2019), the area north of the 
Arctic Circle is expected to store recoverable reserves of 90 
billion barrels of oil, 473 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, 
and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (blue/purple areas 
on the map, Fig. 5). These resources account for 22% of 
undiscovered,  
technically recoverable resources in the world. About 84% of 
the estimated resources are expected to occur offshore, which 
makes exploitation substantially more expensive. The 
exploitation and development of the Arctic resources are 
dependent on the global supply and demand, global market 
prices, political agreements, and technical capacities and 
environmental challenges, which lead to higher extraction 
costs.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Expansion of exploration drilling activity in arctic oil and gas provinces. Location of drilling during different 
periods from the pre – 1960 to 2004. Source: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Arctic Oil and Gas 
2007, Oslo, Norway, p. 8. 
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Figure 5. Main oil and gas resources in the Arctic. Source: https://www.nordregio.org/maps/resources-in-the-arctic-2019/  
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2. The energy policy of the European Union 
The direction of the external energy and security policy of the 
European Union has changed drastically in the last 14 years. 
One of the reasons for this was the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 
January 2006 (Sapir, 2007). This crisis showed that the EU 
has to pay more attention to the security of its energy supply 
and be well prepared for unexpected situations. For a long 
time, Russia has been the primary energy provider for large 
parts of the EU. When, in 2006, it cut off the gas supply for 
political reasons, the dangers of such heavy dependency on 
one provider became clear (Mártoni & Kacsó, 2004). The EU 
revealed the degree of its vulnerability because of its 
significant energy demand. It became clear that a new energy 
security strategy would be necessary for the prosperity of the 
EU. The Green Paper was published in 2006 to give 
directions and suggestions for the member states and help 
them to form the Common Energy Policy. At the same time, 
it opened up new challenges. The Green Paper brought up the 
question of whether the EU, in fact, needed the Common 
European Strategy for Energy or not.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. The EU primary energy production shows the 
changes in the mix of oil, gas, solid fuels, nuclear, hydro and 
other renewables between 1981 and 2015. Source: 
http://euanmearns.com/  
 
The six issues of the 2006 Green Paper were concerned with 
competitiveness and internal energy markets, diversification 
of energy mix, solidarity, sustainable development, 
innovation and technology, and external policy. I would like 
to emphasize the importance of external policy. The 
fundamental principles of external energy strategy stated: “A 
coherent external energy policy is essential to deliver 
sustainable, competitive and secure energy (European 
Commission, 2006). The EU will not be able to speak on one 
voice without such a policy. In the external energy paragraph, 
five sub-points described the possible methods for 
implementing external energy policy. The first point 
emphasized the importance of a clear policy on securing and 
diversifying energy supplies. The second point, one of 
particular relevance in this project, described the importance 
of energy partnership with producers, transit countries and 
other international actors. This point declared that “energy 
issues are growing features of the EU‘s political dialogues 
with other major energy consumers (such as the US, China, 
and India), including through multilateral cooperation, like 
the G8 (European Commission, 2006). The third point in the 
paragraph of the Green Paper in question was the imperative 
effective reaction to external crisis situations. The fourth 
point outlined the integration of energy with other policies in 
foreign policy. The fifth point was a declaration about how 
energy can promote development. Finally, Article 194 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon created the common energy policy which 
came into force on 1 December 2009. Looking at the long 
period without a common energy policy, it is evident that 
huge economic power cannot be used or grown effectively 
without forming a common voice. The treaty mentioned four 
points defining the aims of the Common Energy Policy 
(EUR-Lex 2008). The first point is to ensure the functionality 
of the energy market. The second aim is to ensure the security 
of energy supply in the European Union. The third point 
includes the necessity of energy efficiency and energy saving. 
Furthermore, the development of renewable energy sources is 
also included. The fourth point is the promotion of the 
interconnections of energy networks. Additionally, it does not 
affect a Member States’ right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply 
(EUR-Lex, 2008). Interesting, that the EU's primary energy 
production has been constantly reduced from the peak period 
between 1986 and 1988 from more than 1000 million tonnes 
of oil equivalent per annum to about 750 million tonnes by 
2015 (Fig. 6). From 2005 the production of renewables 
increased due to harder environmental legislation and phasing 
out the coal industry for environmental, economic and 
political reasons (Mearns, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 7. EU primary energy consumption has been in decline 
since 2005 due to higher energy prices, economic recession, 
and environmental policies. Source: http://euanmearns.com/    
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    Figure 8. Coal (lignite and hard coal) production and import in Europe in 2018. Source:     
    https://euracoal.eu/info/euracoal-eu-statistics/  
 
 
Figure 9. Crude oil import to the EU 2000 – 2017. 
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The energy consumption of the European Union was 
constantly rising until 2005 then continuously declined (Fig. 
7). The relevant rates of fossil fuel usage and the renewables 
are changing, renewables are constantly growing, but the total 
energy consumption is declining. The primary reason is the 
increase in energy prices that began in 2002. The secondary 
reason is the economic recession, particularly strong in 2008, 
which can be the cause of the big drop in EU consumption in 
2009. The third reason for the declining consumption is 
energy policy where positive measures of energy 
conservation may be supplemented by the subversive 
influence of an expensive and unreliable electricity system on 
economic performance (Mearns, 2016). The use of coal for 
energy production and heat is still dominant in the European 
Union (Fig. 8). The main hard coal provider to the European 
Union is Russia with 26 percent. The rate of Russian imports 
has been increasing drastically. South Africa and Australia 
follow it with 21.5 and 13.6 percent of the whole amount of 
their import. Colombia, the United States, and Indonesia have 
13.5, 9.7 and 8.2 percent. All other countries supply only 7.3 
percent. The rate of hard coal usage is not the highest 
compared with the rate of oil and gas in the European Union. 
It is 18.3 percent of the total energy consumption. The import 
of cured oil is more divided among importers (Fig. 9). 
According to this figure Russia supplies 34 percent, twice as 
much as the next supplier, Norway, which supplies only 15 
percent. Libya, Saudi Arabia and other countries from the 
Middle East provide 10.2, 7.2 and 6.3 percent, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 10.  Extra-EU imports of natural gas 2017. Source: 
Eurostat 2017. 
Russia is by far the leading provider of gas, with 40.8 percent 
as figure 10. shows. For the EU, it is a scary number, clearly 
signifying that the EU has a serious dependence on Russia. 
Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe import natural gas 
from Yamburg.  Norway is the second biggest importer of gas 
with 26.7 percent. Algeria, Nigeria, and Libya together do not 
provide even as much as that. They provide 25.3 percent. 
Qatar, Egypt, Trinidad and Tobago, and other countries 
represent only the remaining 7.1 percent of the EU ‘s gas 
imports. Additionally, Northern Europe complements its gas 
demand with liquid gas.  
It is worth to compare the trends of energy consumption of 
the world and the European Union. In contrast to the 
declining trend in the EU, world consumption is continuously 
growing, particularly when fossil fuels, oil, natural gas, and 
coal are concerned (Fig. 11). The decline in fossil energy 
consumption cannot be expected before 2025 according to Li 
(2017). World historical oil, natural gas, and coal 
consumption presented in figure 11. from 1950 to 1964 is 
estimated from carbon dioxide emissions (Boden, Marland, 
and Andres 2017); data for world primary energy 
consumption and its composition from 1965 to 2016 has been 
provided by BP (2017); while world primary energy 
consumption and its composition from 2017 to 2050 is based 
on the projections of Li (2017).  
 
 
Figure 11. World historical oil, natural gas, and coal 
consumption from 1950 projected until 2050. Source: 
https://seekingalpha.com/Arcticle/4083393-world-energy-
2017minus-2050-annual-report     
 
The abovementioned importers of the European Union make 
us understand the relevance of the Arctic region. The two 
most important fossil energy importers of the EU are Russia 
and Norway. They are both Arctic states. The European 
energy policy tries to find a way to be less dependent on 
Russia. The diversification of energy suppliers is an 
important aim of the European energy policy. The Arctic 
region would be an appropriate energy supplier region for the 
EU due to its geographical location. As long as fossil energy 
is used and accepted, the EU has to find a way to get more 
energy import from the Arctic.  
 
2.1. The EU policy toward the Arctic 
 
The European Union has three member states with territories 
in the Arctic. Namely, they are Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden. The other link between the EU and the Arctic is the 
European Economic Area. This cooperation includes Iceland 
and Norway. The other remaining members of the Arctic 
Council are Russia, Canada and USA have a strategic 
partnership with the EU.   
 
The foreign policy of the EU is based on international co-
operations, agreements, and common operations. EU’s 
performance on the international stage is characterized by 
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Neo-Liberalism. The EU tries to achieve its aims through 
international negotiations. The Northern Dimension 
establishment is clear proof of the Neo-Liberal policy. The 
Northern Dimension policy was elaborated by Norway, 
Iceland, the EU member states and Russia in 1999. This is an 
EU-led initiative which determined the key priority themes- 
among other things, economy, business, infrastructure, 
environment, natural sources, cross-border cooperation, and 
regional development- to be discussed.  The Second Northern 
Dimension Action Plan, 2004-2006 lists the Energy issue in 
the Specific Priorities and Objectives. The document stresses 
that the Northern Dimension area is rich in natural resources 
and offers significant opportunities for energy production and 
supply. One of the main objectives of the Northern energy 
sector is the development of the electricity and natural gas 
transportation network in the Northern Dimension region. 
Furthermore, the Northern Dimension partners are going to 
improve the co-ordination of their energy production and 
supply. The development of energy efficiency and 
environmentally friendly utilization are important aims, too.      
However, the Northern Dimension policy is not the only way 
how the EU tries to get near to the energy sources of the 
Arctic. “The European Union and the Arctic Region 
Communication” was published by the Commission in 2008. 
The document proposes actions and cooperation in three main 
areas: protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its 
population, promoting sustainable use of resources and 
contributing to enhancing multilateral governance. 
Communication particularly focuses on hydrocarbons. Arctic 
resources could contribute to enhancing the EU’s security of 
supply concerning energy and raw materials in general. It 
proposes actions to strengthen the foundations of long-term 
cooperation, particularly with Norway and Russia (Johnston, 
2010). 
 
An additional proposal is facilitating the sustainable and 
environmentally friendly exploration, extraction and 
transportation of the Arctic fossil fuel energy sources. A 
further proposal is the promotion of the researches and 
development in offshore technology and infrastructure based 
on the European experiences in the offshore oil and gas 
exploration industry. However, in view of the environmental, 
economic and political issues raised by the scientific 
community and civil organizations (often supported by 
scientists) due to climate change and pollution, offshore oil 
and gas drilling in the Arctic presents both opportunities and 
challenges. Although the oil and gas industry is one of the key 
economic drivers across the Arctic (AMAP, 2007:1) and 
sustainable economic development is desirable, but the 
energy sector must not have unacceptable cultural or 
ecological impacts (Kuusama, 2019). The Arctic Council 
Working Groups see hydrocarbon extraction as a climatic and 
contaminant issue as well as a challenge to biodiversity and 
marine safety (Arctic Council, 2017). In the oil and gas 
industry, the risks of pollution cannot be completely 
eliminated or prevented even with the best available 
technology. Furthermore, global warming has made Arctic 
waters generally more accessible for modern extraction 
industries. In a political environment increasingly aware of 
climate change, the fossil fuel-based energy sector produces 
a lion’s share of global carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
The key element of the EU’s new Arctic policy is to gain 
permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. However, 
the EU’s recent debate on seal hunting with Canada sets back 
its strategy. Canada plainly stands against the EU’s 
permanent observer status. The Canadian foreign minister 
Mr. Lawrence Cannon stressed after the meeting that  
“Canada does not feel that the European Union, at this stage, 
has the required sensitivity to be able to acknowledge the 
Arctic Council, as well as its membership, and so, therefore, 
I am opposed to it…I see no reason why…they should be a 
permanent member of the Arctic Council ” Eva Aariak the 
minister of Nunavut state that “the Arctic Council…was 
formed to promote co-operation and coordination and 
interaction in regards to member states in the Arctic. What the 
European Union is trying to do is not those.”  
 
Denmark also disagrees with the EU in the case of seal 
hunting. Greenland is the part of the Kingdom of Denmark 
but not the part of the European Union. The seal hunting is a 
relevant part of the Inuit economy in Greenland. It can be the 
reason why Denmark does not support the permanent 
observer membership of the European Union nonetheless it is 
also an EU member state. As for Norway’s opinion, on the 
one side, it also agrees with seal hunting so it should 
disapprove of the EU’s requirements, on the other side, as a 
relevant energy importer of the EU could make a 
commanding profit from their closer corporation.  
 
Basically, the EU was not in the best situation to reach its aims 
until recently, because some of the influential member states 
object to its permanent observer status. The problem is if the 
EU wants to get the energy sources of the Arctic through the 
Neo-Liberal policy it will not be possible without the 
permanent members’ support. Even though the relationship 
between the EU and Canada softened, the EU’s candidacy for 
permanent observer status was again blocked in 2015, this 
time by Russia (Cáp, 2019). Still, the absence of permanent 
observer status does not prevent the EU from participating in 
working group meetings within the Arctic Council itself. In 
order to increase the involvement in the Arctic policy, in 
October 2018, the European Commission, Finland, and 
Germany organized the “Second Arctic Science Ministerial” 
conference in Berlin. Although not directly on the Arctic 
Council’s agenda, the conference provided the opportunity 
for stakeholders (including all members of the Arctic 
Council), leaders and media representatives to debate societal 
and environmental issues (Cáp, 2019). In view of 
environmental hazards caused by extensive oil and gas 
exploration, the role of the European Union might grow to 
counterbalance these risks: if the Arctic region becomes the 
major oil and gas province within the next decades, then 
Norway and Russia will be the main providers of fossil 
energy. Russia has by far the largest resource base but lacks 
the experience and technology to develop it alone while 
Norway has already started developing infrastructure in the 
Barents Sea. In the recent energy situation, both countries are 
highly motivated to find new oil (and gas) resources to ensure 
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stable economic growth in the long term. Although Russia is 
facing substantial geopolitical difficulties recently, all these 
factors might provide the catalyst for the development of the 
Arctic as an oil- and natural gas-producing region by the 
beginning of the 2030s, if this development will not be altered 
or blocked by legal, environmental and economic constraints 
caused by legislative measures, falling oil and gas prices and 
international political interventions (Arctic Council, 2017). 
 
3. The energy strategy of China 
 
Chinese energy policy has a much different historical 
background than its European counterpart. In contrast with 
the EU, China even does not have an energy minister and 
ministry. According to Hongtu Zhao, China has an energy 
strategy rather than an energy policy. The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the main 
policy-making and regulatory authority in the Chinese energy 
sector. Additionally, four ministries control the various 
elements of the country’s oil policy. The National Energy 
Administration (NEA) was established by the government in 
July 2008 to be the key energy regulator in the country. The 
NEA is linked with the NDRC and it is responsible for 
approving the new energy projects in China and setting the 
domestic wholesale energy prices. Also, it is responsible for 
implementing the central government’s policy of energy 
issues and other duties. The NDRC is a department of the 
Chinese highest executive power, China’s State Council.  
Evidently, what constitutes energy policy in China and its 
place in the political system is quite different than in the rest 
of the world. The Chinese energy strategy can be divided into 
four areas according to the study on China’s Energy Policy 
and its Contribution to International stability written by Philip 
Andrews-Speed (2006).  
 
1. The first is the diversification and security of oil imports.  
Figure 8. shows the main routes of oil import. In Figure 1, can 
see clearly the sources of oil imports to China. To find new 
energy supplier regions is part of this point. The Arctic region 
would be appropriate for China. The second area of energy 
strategy has a tight connection with the first one. 
 
2. The second is to secure energy transport routes. A 
significant quantity of fuel is imported through the shipping 
industry (figure 12. and 13. show the routes). To avoid the 
risks inherent in that means of transport, China plans to build 
pipelines from Russia. The pipelines would reduce the 
Chinese dependency on oil-tankers, but their existence might 
damage the relations with those who benefit from Chinese sea 
transports.  The second area covers event Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) transport and other raw materials.  
 
3. The third area of the Chinese energy strategy is overseas 
investments. At the government’s instigation in 1993, 
“China’s National Oil Companies (NOCs) began going 
abroad to acquire stakes in oil field…”  This program was 
called “Going Global”. At the beginning of the program it 
was a slow process and not as public as nowadays. In 2006 
China started a sub-program of “Going Global” aiming to 
produce 60-80 national big multinational enterprises, which 
would be able to compete with the biggest existing 
international companies. They have become the “national 
champions” of China. PetroChina was the biggest 
multinational company in the world in August 2007 and seven 
out of the top thirty companies in the world are Chinese firms 
and with parts of them owned by the Chinese government. 
The Chinese dominance is even more notable in the banking 
sector; among the top five banks listed, three are Chinese.  
 
The leaders of the overseas investments come from the 
Chinese government and from NOCs (Xin Ma and Andrews-
Speed, 2006). The government promotes the idea that the 
Chinese enterprises hold the production right of overseas oil 
sources as a back-up plan for when their mainland supplies 
run out. At such a time, “national champion” oil companies 
will be able to expand overseas. NOCs can be used by the 
government to support wider diplomatic and strategic goals 
all over the world. The Chinese government can discover the 
needs of the host governments. Additionally, some of the host 
countries need help from NOCs in order to fulfill their own 
political goals. China is ready to offer its help in exchange to 
secure its energy supply from these countries. We can classify 
the “problematic” countries from an investment point of view 
into 5 classes. One of the 5 groups includes the governments 
that wish to get back the control over their resources. 
Kazakhstan and Russia are good examples of this type 
(Andrews-Speed, 2006). The China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation CNOOC and PetroChina are the most active in 
energy investments. The aims of these investments to 
increase Chinese national security through a safe energy 
supply (Inotai, 2007). China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) alone has responsibility for 60 percent of the total oil 
and 80 percent of the total gas output of China. PetroChina is 
the publicly listed arm of CNPC. The China National 
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), which has responsibility 
for offshore oil exploration and production, are in charge of 
the internal energy market. However, as a result of growing 
attention to offshore zones, CNOOC’s role has become more 
important. The company is now a keystone of the Chinese 
External Energy Strategy.   
 
4. The fourth part of the external energy strategy is the role of 
oil and gas diplomacy. The connection between the Chinese 
government and NOCs is getting closer and closer both at 
home and abroad. The government uses NOCs as part of 
external energy diplomacy. In countries strategically 
important for China, the government operates and plays the 
lead role in negotiations. The strategically important 
countries are Kazakhstan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and, 
most importantly, Russia. Other countries are less important 
from a strategic point of view, but the government’s role can 
be significant in the cases of Angola and Venezuela. In less 
important countries, the role of the government is only that of 
a supporter, it puts NOCs forward in the negotiation process. 
 
Oil represents 20 percent of the total consumption and it is 
the most significant challenge to the external energy strategy 
(figure 11.). The government and NOCs pay special attention 
to this energy source. Oil usage has been constantly 
increasing since 1965 (Fig. 14). 
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Figure 12. Major oil major trade movements 2018 – trade flows worldwide (million tonnes). Source: BP Annual Statistical 
Review of the World, 2019.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. Major gas trade movements 2018. The year 2018 with both global consumption and production increasing by over 
5%, showed one of the strongest growth rates in either gas demand or output for over 30 years. Source: BP plc, FGE MENA 
gas service, IHS 
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According to the U.S. Energy Informational Administration, 
China is the third-biggest oil importer in the world, importing 
3858 thousand barrels per day, and the second-biggest 
consumer.  As mentioned above, Chinese consumption has 
soared above domestic production since China became a net 
importer of oil in the early 90s. One-third of the Chinese 
imported oil came from Saudi Arabia and Angola in 2008. 
Iran, Oman, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela, Kuwait, and 
Kazakhstan follow them with much smaller fractions. It is 
important to note that China, in contrast with the EU, has its 
own quite significant oil production. The small amount of 
coal that China imports come from Mongolia, Australia, 
Canada and Russia. However, China faces the difficult 
challenge of drastically decreasing its coal usage in the near 
future to curb skyrocketing pollution levels. It is no easy task 
to replace such a particularly cheap and effective energy 
source, especially considering the degree to which China 
depends on coal. 
 
 
Figure 14. Oil production vs consumption of China 1965 – 
2018 measured in kb/d (kilo-barrels/day)3 Source: 
https://crudeoilpeak.info/peak-oil-in-asia-where-will-the-oil-
come-from-for-the-asian-century  
 
Natural gas does not represent a significant portion of the 
energy consumption total; it is only 3 percent. Natural gas has 
been complemented with LNG and government programs 
have been created in 2009 to launch more LNG ports in 
China. LNG and renewable resources will help diversify the 
energy in the coal-dominated spectrum. The government 
expects LNG to change significantly the Chinese energy mix.  
China imported its first shipment of LNG in 2006.  CNOOC 
is the major actor in importing LNG. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 1 cubic metre = 6.2898 oil barrels 
3.1. The Chinese policy toward the Arctic 
 
Although China is engaged in strategies, according to China’s 
Assistant Minister of Foreign affairs, Mr. Hu Zhengyue 
”China does not have an Arctic strategy” but it seems to have 
a clear agenda. China respects the sovereignty of the Arctic 
states and judicial rights but promotes the cooperation 
between the Arctic and Non-Arctic states (Jacobsen, 2010). 
Mr. Guo Peiqing an associate professor at the Ocean 
University of China stressed that “circumpolar nations have 
to understand that Arctic affairs are not only regional issues 
but also international ones”. Basically, China considers the 
Arctic a common heritage of the world (Graham-Harrison 
2010). The shipping routes are considered by China as 
important world heritage as the energy sources of the Arctic. 
The Neo-Liberal way to reach the Arctic energy sources can 
be seen in the ambition to gain the permanent observer status 
of the Arctic Council and the bilateral dialogues with Arctic 
states.  Mr. Rob Huebert, a political scientist of the University 
of Calgary stressed: “the Chinese are about to emerge as a 
major Arctic power”. He had declared his point just right 
before he traveled to Beijing and Shanghai for the Sino-
Canadian forum at the end of February in 2010. That forum 
was held about the Arctic issues and he visited the Chinese 
main polar research institution. 
 
China has already had a bilateral dialogue with Norway on 
Arctic issues. In the first China- Norway meeting of 2009, the 
most promoted points in their dialogue were: effects of 
climate change and polar researches. Additionally, the parties 
changed their views about Arctic policy, energy issues and sea 
routes (Jakobson, 20101). We can see a clear intention of 
China towards Arctic states either altogether or separately. 
 
China has two different ways to reach the Arctic energy 
sources. Besides the Neo-Liberal policy of China to gain 
permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, it has 
another way to achieve its aims. The realist way to get energy 
sources from the Arctic through foreign investments, joint 
ventures or the international market (Byers, 2010). This 
realist policy was visible clearly as a priority of the Chinese 
energy strategy: the relevant role of gas diplomacy, overseas 
investments, the security of energy transport routes, and the 
diversification and security of oil import. In contrast with the 
Neo-Liberal way, the Realist policy seems to be already more 
efficient toward the Arctic energy sources. The most desired 
partner from the Arctic countries is Russia. China has the 
capital and Russia has a territory in the Arctic. The Yamalo-
Nenets Autonomous region owns 90 percent of the natural gas 
production of Russia. Furthermore, it gives 12 percent of its 
oil production, too (UPI, 2010). Dmitry Kobylkin, the 
governor of this region stated: “we are ready to offer our 
Chinese partners mutually advantageous and constructive 
cooperation in such spheres as hydrocarbons and solid 
mineral resources, the Northern Sea Route, agriculture, 
innovations and science” (Novosti, 2010).  
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China seems to be a successful partner for energy 
cooperation. The only thing that is missing, is the well-
developed technology for special drilling and transport 
conditions. The Deutsche Bank analysis marks that the 
development of the Russian Shtokman natural gas project in 
the Barents Sea could have taken from 5 up to 8 years. This 
time the estimation included the period from the initiation of 
substantial capital investment to full production. The result of 
this analysis stressed that “with the technical and 
environmental complexities involved in the development, we 
see a high risk of delay and cost over-runs” (Thomas et.al. 
2004). It means that banks usually do not show a high 
willingness to invest in Arctic explorations. Contrary to 
banks, China was willing to invest in order to get energy 
sources from Arctic Russia in order to ensure its sustainable 
energy supply, which seemed to be relevant even to Russia. 
The Chinese and Russian dialogues about energy are more 
developed than the other Arctic states’ activities. However, 
during the last ten years, the expansion of shale gas and the 
lower gas prices had quickly changed the international energy 
markets, which resulted in the closure of the Shtokman 
project and in June 2019  the company that was to develop 
the huge natural gas field in the Barents Sea has been quietly 
abolished (Staalesen, 2019). 
 
Russia owns 15 percent of the world’s total hydrocarbon 
reserves. Vladimir Putin plainly stressed that he wants “to 
position Russia as the key dealer at the new Arctic energy 
table” (Glover, 2010).  Furthermore, the Russian biggest 
shipping company made an agreement with China to carry oil 
from Murmansk to China across the Arctic Ocean (Novosti, 
2010). That cooperation also represents the efficiency of the 
Realist way of Chinese energy strategy. The high-level 
cooperation can be seen in the several common projects of 
Russia and China.  
 
4. New development: China is going green 
China, due to its vast population and fast-growing industry, is 
now the world’s largest greenhouse-gas emitter, accounting 
for more than 25% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
Even in per capita terms, it has just overtaken the European 
Union average, but still far behind the US level. This reflects 
the race for economic dominance with an electricity system 
based 70% on coal, and China’s global leadership in heavy 
industries such as steel, cement, and chemicals. Recognizing 
the urgency of reforming the energy supply and 
environmental policies, the Chinese government initiated vast 
investment programmes in renewable energy sources during 
the last ten years with the brave strategy to phase out coal 
from energy production. As a first step, China has already 
canceled further investments in coal-based industries. China 
is already by far the biggest investor in wind and solar power 
and is now canceling plans for further coal investment. And 
as China builds a low-carbon economy, it enjoys a massive 
resource advantage. 
 
According to a recent report by the International Energy 
Agency, the world’s largest wind and solar resources are 
located in China’s sparsely populated western provinces of 
Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. In principle, 
covering just 5% of that total land area with solar panels could 
supply China with 6,000 TW hours of electricity per year, 
which alone could satisfy the country’s entire current 
electricity demand. The wind resources are also massive and 
have vast development potential (Scheel, 2019). Another 
important way to increase the effectiveness and the efficiency 
of renewable energy production and use is sector coupling, 
the interconnection of power, heating, and transport and 
particularly the electrification of heating and transport, which 
is aiming to increase the uptake of renewables in the transport 
and thermal sectors. Sector coupling also allows the 
integration of large proportions of variable renewable energy, 
although this is still at an early stage. China is specifically 
encouraging the electrification of heating, manufacturing, 
and transport in high-renewable areas (Teske et.al. 2017).  
 
The new Chinese energy strategy is surprisingly simple: a) 
electrify everything and b) clean up the power system. 
Bringing power to all the people of China at a low cost has 
been a core of this already successful strategy: since 2000, 
China has added enough power generation capacity to meet 
the combined electricity needs of Japan, India, and Germany. 
In recent years China added over 50 GW of new solar 
capacity to the grid last year, which is more than the total solar 
capacity of the United States (Scheel, 2019). Considering 
these development trends, in the not so far distant future 
China’s interest in the Arctic fossil energy reserves may 
decline and the competition between energy buyers may not 
be actually any longer.  
 
5. The most sustainable way forward: integrated energy 
systems 
 
There are vast renewable energy reserves in the world, 
including geothermal energy (geothermal power plants and 
heat pump systems), solar (photovoltaic) power, hydropower, 
wind, solid biomass, liquid biofuels (ethanol, biodiesel), 
biogas, syngas, and waste to energy programmes, which build 
on recycling and the re-use of waste resources (Némethy and 
Kőmíves, 2016). There are substantial renewable energy 
resources in the arctic and sub-arctic areas, such as the 
geothermal energy of Iceland, the biomass in the boreal 
forests, wind energy, hydropower (e.g. the vast hydroelectric 
power plants in Sweden, producing over 40% of the country’s 
electricity), etc. Bioenergy is a particularly useful source, 
since it may be linked with bio-degradable waste systems as 
a component in larger, more complex energy systems 
(Némethy, 2018).   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
China’s energy policy has two significant advantages 
compared with the liberal policy of the European Union. “The 
first relates to China’s willingness to ignore international 
opinion in its dealings with ‘states of concern’ such as Iran, 
Sudan, Burma, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, 
Uzbekistan and a number of states in central and west Africa.”  
 
The second advantage of China is the capability to ignore the 
internal policy of the energy supplier countries. It means that 
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China does not take care of the politics of the countries where 
it invested in, it does not try to make any influence on the 
supplier countries’ political life, China is non-committal and 
uninvolved in any domestic affairs of them. This policy is 
undermining the western countries’ policy, which tries to 
encourage good governance, democracy, and helps the states 
to promote their own interests. China comes into conflict with 
the EU’s interests in these countries. The two powers’ 
methods of diplomacy and the aims are sometimes extremely 
different. The EU tries to establish common projects, 
technology transfer, offering help, protect human rights, and 
liberalize the supplier country. These are commendable aims, 
but they can be even harmful from a purely commercial point 
of view. China has more utilitarian aims than the EU and it 
does not want to invest energy, money, and efforts to make 
changes in the supplier countries. China’s exclusive focus in 
these situations is business.  
     
The Chinese Energy strategy follows Realism because it 
wants to supply its energy demand in all circumstances. 
However, the Chinese policy had to change a few of its 
instruments in the past few years in order to be an acceptable 
business partner of the other international partners. China had 
to employ the methods of western policies such as dialogues, 
strategic partnerships, and common operations. It meant that 
the usage of the liberal tools in shaping the Chinese Energy 
strategy and move towards a little bit to the Neo-Liberal 
direction. The “Going Global” program or the closer and 
closer energy cooperation with the EU are good examples of 
this movement. However, China is dealing with the 
international stage in the Neo-Liberal way and makes 
agreements and supports common aims, but when the 
efficiency is not successful it changes its strategy for Realist 
policy. 
 
In view of the changing energy market, falling fossil fuel 
prices, climate change, phasing out coal-based energy 
production, increasing the share of renewable energy sources 
and aiming at carbon-neutral, zero-emission production, the 
competition for arctic fossil fuel resources might become 
insignificant in the future. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
arctic is also rich in renewable energy resources and in other 
mineral resources as well, which might be a new target for 
exploitation.  
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